The civil war that broke out in Syria in 2011 has plunged the country into profound devastation for nearly fourteen years. Millions of people have been displaced, and the social fabric has been damaged in ways that are difficult to reverse. Following the de facto collapse of the Assad regime approximately one year ago, a significant vacuum of power and governance has emerged. This vacuum has given rise to discussions suggesting that, as a result of direct or indirect international interventions, control over Damascus has effectively been ceded to radical armed groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Within the year following the fall of the regime, severe attacks and mass violence were reported across Syria, particularly targeting communities of different religious and identity backgrounds. In Alawite-populated areas, reports documented mass executions and forced displacement; attacks against the Druze population targeted civilian neighborhoods and religious sites. Christian Syriacs have faced systematic pressure, attacks, and massacres in various regions of the country. One of the most striking examples was the attack on the Mor Eliyas Church, in which 25 civilians lost their lives. This incident clearly illustrates the existential threat currently confronting the Christian Suryoye in Syria.
These developments unequivocally demonstrate that the existing political and security order is no longer viable for the affected communities. The collapse of central authority, the rise of radical armed groups, and the interest-driven policies of international actors have placed the issue of security and survival for Alawites, Druze, and Syriacs at the center of the agenda.
The recent protests in Homs, initiated following a call by a religious leader of the Alawite community, Ghazal al-Ghazal, in which demands for a federal system were articulated, represent the political expression of these deep-seated security and existential concerns. The fact that the Druze community had previously also called for a federal system demonstrates that these demands are not isolated, but rather the result of a shared crisis of security, protection, and political representation.
Wadi al-Nasara lies within the boundaries of the Homs and Latakia governorates and is predominantly inhabited by Syricas and Alawite communities. The region is historically known for its multi-religious and multicultural character. Alawites, Syriacs and Druze have lived together in this area for centuries, developing strong social, cultural, and economic ties.
At the present stage, isolated and uncoordinated action by these communities increases their vulnerability to radical forces and renewed waves of violence. Against this backdrop, the idea of a shared federal framework should be understood not merely as a political option, but as a survival strategy aimed at preserving social existence and coexistence.
A federal system does not signify fragmentation for these communities. Rather, it represents a governance model within Syria’s territorial integrity that is based on local self-administration, security, the protection of cultural and religious rights, and mutual recognition. A shared federal vision developed jointly by Alawites, Druze, and Syriacs could pave the way for a pluralistic order and, at the same time, create a stronger and more legitimate political interlocutor vis-à-vis the international community.
In conclusion, peace and stability in Syria cannot be achieved through monolithic, sectarian, or militarized forms of governance. Federal and democratic models grounded in the will of the communities to live together emerge as the most realistic and humane option for the country’s future. A union of Alawites, Syriacs, and Druze around a common federal framework could open a new horizon of hope—not only for these communities, but for Syria as a whole.
